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1. Introduction and wealth taxation characterization 
Though widely used in the European Union, the wealth taxes account for a relatively 
small part of the EU Member States’ tax revenue, when compared with the main sources 
of revenue[i]. At the same time, the political debate and the scientific research developed 
in the field of wealth taxation is very incipient, when compared to another taxation 
bases[ii]. Not even the fact that this kind of taxation constitutes one of the oldest ways 
employed by the states to obtain revenue was able to counter the identified trend[iii]. 
However, in the current time of fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic adjustment, 
taxation of wealth is gaining momentum. The lack of alternatives capable of generating 
an increase in tax revenue within the income and consumption taxation[iv], the growing 
interest in the fairness and redistributions aspects of the tax system[v] and the need to 
adjust the tax system to make it more growth friendly[vi], can be pointed out as the main 
reasons for the recent academic and political debate on wealth taxation. 
When we talk about wealth taxation we’re referring to a very complex reality, capable of 
reunite a very large group of different taxes[vii]. Although there are many types of wealth 
taxes, and with very different characterization between them, we consider that they can 
be grouped into two major categories[viii]: taxes on wealth transfers; and taxes on wealth 
itself. Inside these two main categories it is possible to identify a wide variety of distinct 
taxes. 
The taxes on wealth transfers usually assume the following characterization[ix]: (i) taxes 
on onerous transfers – as the onerous movable transfers are subject to VAT, in this 
subcategory we include the taxes levied on onerous immovable transfers[x]; (ii) and taxes 
on gratuitous transfers – in this subcategory we include the inheritance and gift 
taxation[xi]. The taxes on wealth itself can be classified as follows[xii]: (i) taxes levied 
on the holding or ownership of specific assets – usually immovable property[xiii]; and 
(ii) taxes levied on the taxpayer’s aggregate net-wealth[xiv]. 
 
Furthermore, the wealth taxation may reveal itself through taxes that are specifically 
levied on wealth, but can also be configured as provisions regarding wealth in non-wealth 
taxes[xv]. That’s what happens, for example, with the Portuguese stamp duty, when it 
establishes the taxation of gratuitous transfers. 
The exposed context of growing interest in wealth taxation, the fact that the taxation of 
wealth manifests itself in very different ways, as well as the recent legislative changes 
that can be being identified at this level in the different EU Member States, lead us to 
consider the need/usefulness of tax harmonization within the wealth taxation. 
 
2. The European Union tax harmonization phenomenon 
The tax harmonization phenomenon reflects an effort to eradicate the disparities between 
EU Member States’ internal laws by imposing the same tax solutions between them. 
Indeed, through time, EU law has strongly influenced Member States legal tax systems 
not only by laying down legal rules which played a key role in shaping national 
legislation, but also through the decisions made by the EU Court of Justice (ECJ), which 
has delimited the outlines of the intrastate legislation while interpreting EU treaties. 
However, such influence is not identical in the various areas of tax law, as it is felt with 
more intensity in the field of indirect taxation than in the field of direct taxation. 
Tax harmonization has been developed with greater preponderance under the indirect 
taxes as result of the content of article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU), resulting, for example, in the emanation of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC 
of 28 November 2006, on the common system of value added tax[xvi]. 
Regarding direct taxation, there is no specific legal rule requiring the harmonization of 
the Member States legislation. In this context, we can identify specific movements of tax 
harmonization, established through the emanation of legal standards of EU law governing 
specific aspects of direct taxation, under Article 115 of the TFEU, which allows the 
development of directives for the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States that directly affect the establishment or functioning of 
the internal market. However, tax harmonization has been mainly promoted through the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ[xvii]. 
Indeed, it is possible to identify some solutions in the EU law which aim the adoption of 
joint solutions by Member States on specific aspects of direct taxation, especially income 
taxation level[xviii]. However, in the context of direct taxation, the leading role in 
harmonizing the tax legislation of the Member States has been played by the ECJ, which, 
through its case-law, establishes tax harmonization solutions, through the application of 
the European freedoms. 
Even though we could not find examples of tax harmonization, regarding wealth tax, 
promoted through the formal European lawmaking, it is possible to identify some specific 
cases in which the ECJ, using the European freedoms, has established limits to solutions 
established by the Member States under their domestic law[xix]. In fact, it’s not difficult 
to understand that, when configured in certain way, the imposition of taxes on wealth can 
may restrict the the movement of capital between Member States and between Member 
States and third countries in an illegitimate manner, which is prohibited in accordance 
with Article 63 of the TFEU. 
We consider that we could state a number of reasons, which, jointly considered, may 
support the need/usefulness of establishing solutions harmonizing the domestic laws of 
Member States in the area of wealth taxation, through the production of legal rules at the 
EU level. 
 
3. The need/usefulness of tax harmonization within the wealth taxation in 
the European Union 
As previously mentioned, we believe that it’s possible to identify a set of reasons that 
may support the need/usefulness of establishing solutions harmonizing the domestic laws 
of Member States in the area of wealth taxation. The importance of these reasons is 
reinforced by the fact that wealth taxation has gained momentum in academic and 
political discourse. Without losing sight of the implementation difficulties associated with 
it[xx], the EU Member-States’ seem to be focused on reform the wealth taxation to ensure 
a fairer and growth-friend tax systems. 
Without aiming into a deep and definitive analysis on the referred reasons, and assuming 
the objective to expose them in a brief and clear way, as a way to draw attention to the 
relevance of the topic, we’ll state the reasons that lead us to affirm the need/usefulness of 
tax harmonization within the wealth taxation: 
1. First of all, the definition by the EU of a common legality block in the wealth taxation 
subject is an effective way to prevent potential restrictions imposed into the European 
freedoms by the Member-States’ intern laws. 
2. The establishment of common tax bases on wealth taxation between the Member States 
can be conceived as a way to simplify the fight against elimination of double taxation. 
Ultimately, it may even happen that certain reality is taken for relevant in the context of 
property taxation in one Member State and considered relevant in the context of income 
or consumption taxation in another Member State. Such cases may constitute an obstacle 
to the purpose of elimination of double taxation. Furthermore, they may even become 
deviations from the tax harmonization solutions instituted in the indirect taxation context. 
For instance, certain property transfer operations could be considered relevant in the 
context of consumption taxation in some Member States and under income taxation in 
others. 
3. In addition to the above, the displacement of revenue between the different existing taxes 
in the national context may result on a reduction in tax revenues destined to the EU 
budget. That may happen, for instance, if certain taxable realities are excluded from its 
taxation under value added tax and considered relevant for the purpose of taxation in other 
taxes. 
4. As it can represent a reduction on tax competition, the implementation of common 
solutions into the wealth taxation between the EU Member States intern laws may 
represent a very significant step forward in the effectiveness of this form of taxation. In 
fact, one of the great problems associated with wealth taxation is the easiness of re-
domiciliation of the taxpayers or the relocation of their assets. A Member-State, when 
alone, won’t be able to avoid a residence transfer from a certain taxpayer to another 
Member-State, motivated for tax reasons. That taxpayer will be able to benefit from a 
more favourable tax regime, without major consequences. However, if the wealth taxation 
between Member-States is similar, the taxpayer will not be so encouraged to move to 
another Member State. The alternative would be to change your residence to a territory 
domiciled outside the European Union. But, such a decision entails far more serious 
consequences than simply redirecting within the territory of the EU, which may 
discourage the taxpayer from doing so. 
5. Moreover, the purpose of minimizing distortions of competition and the fight against 
harmful tax competition in EU context tend to claim a rigorous typified selection of the 
exemptions the Member States can concede in the property taxation context. At the same 
time, it claims the normalization of tax rates applicable at the various forms of property 
taxation, by establishing upper and lower limits. 
6. The absence of harmonised solutions of tax incidence in the different Member States can 
result in the insertion of the same factual reality under property taxes with very different 
settings. This fact is especially noticeable when we look at the different tax types that 
generally characterize the property taxation in the different Member States. 
7. The harmonization of property taxation may be able to promote an approximation of the 
economic effort that is required from the Member States’ citizens when they are called to 
pay taxes. Furthermore, it may also ensure higher levels of legal certainty for citizens. 
Facing the same tax scenarios in all Member States, European citizens will be more 
capable to anticipate and predict the legal and tax consequences resulting from their 
behaviours[xxi]. 
8. In addition to the above mentioned, the establishment of a common base of property 
taxation between the various Member States can facilitate collaboration between them in 
the combat of tax evasion phenomenon. 
Considering, on the one hand, the recent academic and political interest within the wealth 
taxation and, on the other hand, the abovementioned vantages of a process of tax 
harmonization in the field of wealth taxation, we believe that there are grounds to begin 
a serious debate on this subject. 
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